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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Dakota Lee Villafuerte appeals from the judgment entered upon his
conditional guilty plea to failing to register as a sex offender. Villafuerte contends
the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss, in which Villafuerte
claimed the state lacked jurisdiction to prosecute him for failing to register as a
sex offender because, according to Villafuerte, his failure to update his address
after he absconded was not a crime in Idaho.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
In 2012, Villafuerte pied guilty to battery with intent to commit a serious
felony (lewd conduct) and the court imposed a unified 15 year sentence, with
three years fixed, and retained jurisdiction. (See R., pp.37-38.) At the end of the
retained jurisdiction period, the court placed Villafuerte on probation and
Villafuerte registered as a sex offender as required by I.C. § 18-8304. (See R.,
p.38.) Villafuerte "listed his parent's home in Nampa, Idaho as his residence."
(R., p.38.)
In November 2013, after Villafuerte was ordered by his probation officer to
serve discretionary jail time, Villafuerte did not report to the jail, or return to his
registered address, but instead absconded to Nevada, and was later arrested in
Utah. (R., pp.38-39, 47.) The state subsequently charged Villafuerte with failing
to register as a sex offender for "fail[ing] to update his registration information
within two working days as required by statute."

(R., pp.8-9, 18-19, 35-36.)

Villafuerte filed a motion to dismiss, claiming the "State of Idaho lacks jurisdiction
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over the crime" because it was not a crime in Idaho for him to fail to provide a
current address after he absconded to Nevada. (R., pp.37-42.) The district court
denied Villafuerte's motion, after which Villafuerte entered a conditional guilty
plea, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion. (R., pp.54-70, 74-77.)
The court imposed a unified six year sentence, with six months fixed, to run
consecutive to a sentence imposed in a separate case.
Villafuerte filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.81-83.)

2

(R., pp.79-80.)

ISSUE
Villafuerte states the issue on appeal as:
Whether the district court erred when it denied Mr. Villafuerte's
motion to dismiss this case because the State of Idaho did not have
jurisdiction over the alleged criminal act.
(Appellant's Brief, p.4.)

The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Has Villafuerte failed to establish the State of Idaho lacks jurisdiction to
prosecute him for a violation of I.C. § 18-8311 (failing to register as a sex
offender) based on Villafuerte's non-compliance with Idaho's sex offender
registration requirements?
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ARGUMENT
Because Villafuerte Has Failed To Establish The State Lacks Jurisdiction To
Prosecute Him For Failing To Comply With Idaho's Sex Offender Registration
Requirements, He Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Motion To
Dismiss
A.

Introduction
Villafuerte claims the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss,

arguing, as he did below, that the court lacked jurisdiction over the alleged crime
of failing to register as a sex offender. (Appellant's Brief, pp.5-20.) Villafuerte's
claim fails.

Application of the correct legal standards to the facts of his case

supports the district court's conclusion that the State of Idaho has jurisdiction to
prosecute Villafuerte for failing to comply with Idaho's sex offender registration
requirements.

B.

Standard Of Review
"An interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which this Court

exercises free review."

State v. Lee, 153 Idaho 559, 561, 286 P.3d 537, 539

(2012) (brackets, quotations, and citation omitted).

"Jurisdiction is likewise a

question of law and is reviewed de novo." State v. Lute, 150 Idaho 837, 839, 252
P.3d 1255, 1257 (2011) (citing State v. Barros, 131 Idaho 379, 381, 957 P.2d
1095, 1097 (1998)).

C.

The State Of Idaho Has Jurisdiction To Prosecute Villafuerte For Failing
To Comply With Idaho's Sex Offender Registration Requirements
"Subject matter jurisdiction is the power to determine cases over a general

type or class of dispute." Lute, 150 Idaho at 840, 252 P.3d at 1258 (quoting
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Bach v. Miller, 144 Idaho 142, 145, 158 P.3d 305, 308 (2007)). "Because the
charging document is the instrument that confers subject matter jurisdiction on a
court, whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction depends upon whether the
charging document is legally sufficient." State v. Frauenberger, 154 Idaho 294,
298,297 P.3d 257, 261 (Ct. App. 2013) (citing State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694,
708, 215 P.3d 414, 428 (2009)).

"An indictment or an information confers

jurisdiction if it alleges that the defendant committed a criminal offense within the
state of Idaho."

~

The Amended Information alleges that Villafuerte violated I.C. § 18-8311
along with other provisions of the Sex Offender Registration Notification and
Community Right-to-Know Act ("SORA"). (R., pp.35-36.) Section 18-8311, I.C.,
provides, in relevant part: "An offender subject to registration who knowingly fails
to register, verify his address, or provide any information or notice as required by
this chapter shall be guilty of a felony."

I.C. § 18-8311(1).

Because the

Amended Information alleges Villafuerte "committed a criminal offense within the
state of Idaho," it is sufficient to confer jurisdiction. Therefore, dismissal based
on a jurisdictional defect would only be appropriate if "the facts alleged do not
constitute a prosecutable act under the laws of the State." State v. Olin, 153
Idaho 891, 894, 292 P.3d 282, 285 (Ct. App. 2012). Villafuerte contends such a
defect exists because, he argues, the underlying facts do not support a criminal
charge in Idaho because SORA does not impose upon him an obligation to
update his address when he absconds and leaves the state. (Appellant's Brief,
pp.13-14.) Rather, Villafuerte asserts, "the criminal act - failing to register - may
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have occurred in Nevada or Utah, but it certainly did not occur in Canyon
County," Idaho.

(Appellant's Brief, pp.13-14 (footnote omitted).)

Villafuerte's

interpretation of the statute and the applicable legal standards is incorrect.
As noted, under I.C. § 18-8311 (1 ), it is a felony for an offender subject to
SORA to knowingly "fail[ ] to register, verify his address, or provide any
information or notice" required by SORA. In turn, I.C. § 18-8309(1) requires an
offender subject to registration who changes his name, street address or actual
address, or employment or student status, to "appear in person within (2) working
days after the change at the office of the sheriff of the county where the offender
is required to register and notify the sheriff of all changes in the information
required."

This notification requirement is satisfied if the offender appears "in

another jurisdiction in which registration is required and notifies that jurisdiction of
the changed information."

I.C. § 18-8309(1 ).

"Jurisdiction" for purposes of

SORA includes any state. I.C. § 18-8303(9). Thus, changes in information that
an offender is obligated to update under I.C. § 18-8309(1) must be reported to
the county sheriff or to an official in another state, if that state requires
registration, and the failure to do so is a felony, I.C. § 18-8311. 1 That Villafuerte
can satisfy the requirement to update his registration information in Idaho by
registering in another state does not mean he is not guilty of violating I.C. § 18-

1

It is also a felony for an offender subject to the registration requirements of
SORA to fail to "immediately notify the department[, i.e., the Idaho State Police],
of any lodging lasting seven (7) days or more, regardless of whether the lodging
would be considered a residence as defined in section 18-8303, Idaho Code."
I.C. § 18-8309(2); I.C. § 18-8303(5) (defining "department" for purposes of
SORA). It appears from the facts in the record, that Villafuerte violated this
provision of SORA as well.
6

8311. To the contrary, if Villafuerte changes his address, he must notify either
the county sheriff or, if his address is changed to another state, he must register
there if registration is required. I.C. § 18-8309(1 ). Villafuerte's claim that such a
conclusion would be inconsistent with "United States Supreme Court precedent"
is without merit. (Appellant's Brief, p.17.)
The United States Supreme Court cases on which Villafuerte relies are
Travis v. United States, 364 U.S. 631 (1961), Johnston v. United States, 351
U.S. 215 (1956), United States v. Cores, 356 U.S. 405 (1958), United States v.
Anderson, 328 U.S. 699 (1946), and United States v. Lombardo, 241 U.S. 73
(1916).

(Appellant's Brief, pp.6-14.)

Villafuerte's reliance on these cases is

misplaced because none of the cases discuss SORA much less interpret its
jurisdictional boundaries. Rather, in all of these cases, the Court was interpreting
a federal statute for purposes of determining venue, not jurisdiction. Travis, 364
U.S. at 632-33 (only addressing whether venue was proper in Colorado for
alleged violations of the National Labor Relations Act); Johnston, 351 U.S. at 216
("We must determine the proper venue for the trial" of violations of the Universal
Military Training and Services Act.); Cores, 356 U.S. at 409 ("venue for s 252(c)
[of the Immigration and Nationality Act] lies in any district where the crewman
willfully remains after the permit expires"); Anderson, 328 U.S. at 699 ("On the
merits the issue is narrow, namely, whether in a criminal prosecution under s 11
of the Selective Training and Service Act, for refusal to submit to induction, the
venue is properly laid in the judicial district where the act of refusal occurred
rather than in the district where the draft board which issued the order is
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located.") (code sections omitted); Lombardo, 241 U.S. at 76-78 (based on
interpretation of the word "filed" as used in the "White Slave Traffic Act," Court
found violations of act justiciable in District of Columbia where Commissioner
General of Immigration was located). None of the Supreme Court's decisions
determining the proper venue for prosecuting a violation of United States law,
over which the United States Government has jurisdiction, has any bearing on
whether the State of Idaho has jurisdiction to prosecute a violation of an Idaho
statute.

Villafuerte's claim that "United States Supreme Court precedent"

precludes his prosecution fails.
Villafuerte also contends that Idaho law dictates a finding that there is no
jurisdiction in Idaho over the charged offense.

(Appellant's Brief, pp.7-8.)

Specifically, Villafuerte contends I.C. § 18-202 and I.C. § 19-301 provide that
"Idaho courts only have authority to hear and impose punishment in (i.e., have
jurisdiction over) cases involving acts occurring within the state," and "[t]he only
way around this territorial limitation on jurisdiction is the so-called 'long-arm'
statute," I.C. § 19-302. (Appellant's Brief, p.7.) None of these statutes support
Villafuerte's jurisdictional claim.
First, I.C. § 19-301 governs venue. As the plain language of the statute
indicates, "[v]enue is nonjurisdictional." I.C. § 19-301(2). Second, as previously
noted, SORA requires Villafuerte to update the Idaho Sex Offender Registry
when he changes his address, and he can accomplish this by appearing at the
sheriff's office where he is required to register or by appearing in another state in
which registration is required and notifying that state of the change. I.C. § 18-
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8309(1 ). The failure to update the Idaho Sex Offender Registry is a crime "within
this state," which is all that is required by I.C. § 18-202. Accordingly, there is no
need to determine whether the "so-called 'long-arm' statute," I.C. § 19-302,
applies. (Appellant's Brief, p.7.) Even if this Court determines an analysis under
I.C. § 19-302 is necessary, any such analysis supports a finding that Idaho has
jurisdiction over Villafuerte's violation of I.C. § 18-311.
Idaho Code Section 19-302 "allows a defendant to be liable for
punishment within Idaho 'when the commission of a public offense, commenced
without the state is consummated within its boundaries .... "' State v. Doyle, 121
Idaho 911,913,828 P.2d 1316, 1318 (1992) (quoting I.C. § 19-302). Under this
statute, "an Idaho court will have subject matter jurisdiction over a crime if any
essential element of the crime, including the result, occurs within Idaho." Doyle,
121 Idaho at 914,828 P.2d at 1319. In order to establish a violation of I.C. § 188311, the state must prove (1) the defendant was subject to registration, and (2)
he "knowingly fail[ed] to register, verify his address, or provide any information or
provide any information or notice" as required by SORA.

I.C. § 18-8311(1).

SORA requires, among other things, a registered offender to update his address
with either the county sheriff or another state if the other state requires
registration. I.C. § 18-8309(1 ). At a minimum, the result of Villafuerte's failure to
provide current information to any Idaho official, or to register in either Nevada or
Utah, which Villafuerte admitted he did not do (R., p.48), occurs within Idaho
because Idaho's Sex Offender Registry continues to list him as living at an
incorrect address in Idaho, and Villafuerte cannot be removed from Idaho's Sex
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Offender Registry "until [his] registration in another jurisdiction is complete." I.C.
§ 18-8307(4)(a). It is Villafuerte's interpretation of the law that "ignores the plain

language" of the applicable statutes, not the "district court's reading" that
Villafuerte had "to notify either the jurisdiction to which [he] is moving or the
jurisdiction from which [he] moved."2 (Appellant's Brief, p.17.)
Finally, Villafuerte argues that "the district court's decision is at odds with
the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in State v. Lee, 153 Idaho 559[, 286 P.3d
537] (2012)." 3 (Appellant's Brief, p.18.) This is so, Villafuerte claims, because he
believes the Court in Lee implicitly concluded that (1) a defendant's "only
obligation" under SORA is to "report in the place of his new residence," assuming

2

As part of his "plain language" argument, Villafuerte relies on the Court of
Appeals' unpublished opinion in State v. Wilson, 2013 WL 5488655 (July 12,
2013 Idaho App.), and asserts that although "[u]npublished opinions may not
have precedential value, [] they are still persuasive as examples of a learned
court's conclusion after evaluating the same or similar issues." (Appellant's Brief,
p.17 and n.8.) The state fails to see a distinction between citing an unpublished
opinion for "precedential value" and citing it as an "example of a learned court's
conclusion" on "the same or similar issue[]." (Appellant's Brief, p.17 n.8.)
Nevertheless, the issue in Wilson was whether there was sufficient evidence that
Wilson violated SORA by failing to register annually in Idaho after he moved to
Oregon. Wilson at *1-2. The Court of Appeals concluded the evidence was not
sufficient because the applicable versions of the relevant statutes "relieved an
offender of the duty to register annually in Idaho once the offender moved to
another state." kl at *2. Because the state did not charge Villafuerte with failing
to register annually after absconding from Idaho, Villafuerte's reliance on Wilson,
even if proper despite the fact it is unpublished, is misplaced.
Villafuerte also complains that the district court employed an incorrect rule of
statutory interpretation by stating that Villafuerte's argument would lead to absurd
results. (Appellant's Brief, p.19.) While Villafuerte correctly notes that the Idaho
Supreme Court has rejected the "absurd results" principle of statutory
construction (Appellant's Brief, p.19), the district court's reference to such is
ultimately irrelevant because both jurisdiction and statutory interpretation are
questions of law reviewed de nova. Lee, 153 Idaho at 561, 286 P.3d at 539; Lute,
150 Idaho at 839,252 P.3d at 1257.
3
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that place has a registration requirement, and (2) a defendant has no "obligation
to inform the jurisdiction he left."

(Appellant's Brief, p.18.)

Assuming these

conclusions are implicit in Lee, which the state does not concede, they support a
finding of jurisdiction. 4

The first implicit conclusion, in particular, undermines

Villafuerte's jurisdictional claim because that finding, according to Villafuerte, is
that a registered sex offender has an obligation under SORA to "report in the
place of his new residence" - because Villafuerte failed to do so, the state had
jurisdiction to prosecute him pursuant to I.C. § 18-8311.

Villafuerte has not

demonstrated otherwise.
Villafuerte has failed to establish the district court erred in denying his
motion to dismiss.

The issue in Lee was whether the state presented sufficient evidence that Lee
failed to register as required by I.C. § 18-8309. Lee, 153 Idaho at 561, 286 P.3d
at 539. The Court concluded it did not because Lee moved to another country
and "[n]owhere in [the applicable version of] I.C. § 18-8309(1) or (2) is the word
'country' mentioned." lsL at 562, 286 P.3d at 540. If anything, the Court implicitly
found that the evidence would have been sufficient if the state had shown that
Lee established residence in another state before leaving the country. lsL
("There was no evidence at trial as to how Lee left Idaho, whether it was by air or
by land. Assuming that Lee traveled through one or more states before leaving
the United States, he would not necessarily have had an address in any of those
states. Therefore, there was no evidence that he changed his address to
another state."). Further, under the version of the statute at issue in Lee, an
offender who changed his address to another state was required to provide
written notice to the department. lsL at 561-562, 286 P.3d at 539-540.
Villafuerte's claims regarding alleged "implicit" findings in Lee do not withstand
scrutiny.
4
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment entered
upon Villafuerte's conditional guilty plea to failing to register.
DATED this 10th day of November, 2015.
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